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I. Introduction
A.

The appropriation doctrine is the major water right
system in the West. See 3 W. Hutchins, Water Rights
Laws in the Nineteen Western States 141-649 (1977).

B.

The states have responded in various ways to growing
concern about public values in water such as scenic
beauty, recreational use, and fish and wildlife
habitat. The range of responses is covered by
various presentations at this conference. One
response, and the subject of my presentation, builds
on an appropriation doctrine statutory tradition
requiring review of proposed appropriations for
conformity with the public interest.

C.

Earlier discussions of public interest review
include E. Clyde & D. Jensen, Administrative
Allocation of Water (Nat'l Water Comm'n Legal Study
No. 3, 1971); Clyde, Allocation of Water for
Resource Development, 14 Nat. Res. Law. 519 (1981);
Robie, The Public Interest in Water Rights Administration, 23 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 917 (1977).

II. States with Public Interest Review

A. Sixteen western states by statute mandate public
interest review of initial water right allocation.
The statutes require a permit from an administrative
agency to appropriate water and typically allow a
permit to issue only if the proposed appropriation
conforms to the public interest or public welfare.
Alaska Stat. §§ 46.15.040, -.080(a) (1984 &
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Supp. 1986); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-142, 143 (Supp. 1986); Cal. Water Code §§ 1225, 1255
(West 1971 & Supp. 1987); Idaho Code §i 42-201,
-203A, -203C (Supp. 1986); Kan. Stat. §§ 82a705, -711 (1984); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 85-2-302,
311(2) (1985) (does not use typical "public
interest" or "public welfare" phrasing but a
permit can issue for larger appropriations only
if the proposed use is "a reasonable use," which
is defined in terms of typical public interest
criteria); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 46-233, -234, 2,116 (1984); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 533.325, .370(3), 534.050(1) (1985); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§
72-5-1, -6, -7, 72-12-3, -3.E (1985); N.D. Cent.
Code §§ 61-04-02, -06 (1985); Or, Rev, Stat. §§
537.130, -170(4) (1985); S.D. COMP. Laws Ann. §§
46-1-15, -5-10, -6-3, -2A-9 (1983); Tex. Water
Code Ann. §§ 11.121, -.134(3) (Vernon Supp.
1987); Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-1, -8(1) (1980 &
Supp. 1986); Wash. Rev, Code Ann. §§ 90.03.250,
-.290, -44.050, -44.060 (1962); Wvo. Stet, ill
41-4-503, -3-930 to -932 (1977 & Supp. 1986).
B. Public interest review for water right transfers has
a shorter history and less, but growing, acceptance.
1. Most states by statute require a permit for
transfers that entail a change in point of
diversion, place of use, nature of use, or time
of use of a water right.
2. A water law text published in 1971 reported only
one state with a statute listing detriment to
the public interest as a ground for denial of a
permit. 1 W. Hutchins, supra, at 641-44 (1971).
Today, such statutes exist in eight states.
Idaho Code § 42-222(1) (Supp. 1986); Kan.
Stat. § 82a-708b (Supp. 1986); Mont. Code
Ann. § 85-2-402(3) (1985) (does not use the
phrases "public interest" or "public
welfare," but a permit to change larger
rights can issue only if the proposed change
is "a reasonable use," which is defined in
terms of typical public interest criteria);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 46-290, -294 (1984); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 533.370(3) (1985); N.M. Stat.
2

Ann. 11 72-5-23, -5-23, -12-7, -128-1 (1985 &
Supp. 1986); N.D. Cent. Code § 61-04-15.1
(1985); S.D. Comp. Laws § 46-2A-12 (1983).
3.

Two more states by statute require consideration
of certain public effects of proposed transfers,
namely, impact on instream beneficial uses, Cal.
Water Code §§ 1725 (temporary change), 1735
(trial transfer), 1738 (long-term transfer)
(West Supp. 1987), and economic effect on the
41-3-104 (1977).

community, Wvo. Stat.
4.

Furthermore, public interest review of transfers
might not require express statutory authority.
a. At least two courts have held public
interest review was implicitly required by
various water code provisions. In re Howard
Sleeper, Rio Arriba County Cause No. RA 8453(C), letter to counsel, at 5-6 (April 16,
1985) (case arose before New Mexico enacted

a statute expressly requiring public
interest review), appeal docketed Ensenada
Land & Water Ass'n v. Sleeper, No. 8720/8830
(Ct. App. N.M. 1985); Clark v. Briscoe Irr.
Co., 200 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.Civ.App. 1947).
b.

Alaska has no express statutory public
interest review requirement, but an administrative rule requires it. 11 Alaska
Admin. Code § 93.930(c) (1983).

III. Historical Perspective
A. In 1890, Wyom ing enacted the first permit system for
3

appropriating water. The legislation authorized the
state engineer to reject proposed appropriations
that would be detrimental to the public interest,
but it did not in any way define the public interest. As other states adopted permit systems, their
statutes followed the pattern of not defining the
public interest. Office of Experiment Stations,
U.S. Department of Agriculture, State Engineer and
His Relation to Irriaation 96 (Bulletin 168, 1906).
B.

Four cases decided between 1910 and 1915 helped
shape the new and amorphous public interest concept.
Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 15 N.M. 666, 110 P.
1045 (1910); Cookinham v. Lewis, 58 Or. 484, 114 P.
88 (1911), reh'g denied 58 Or. 484, 115 P. 342
(1911); In re Commonwealth Power Co., 94 Neb. 613,
143 N.W. 937 (1913); Rita Horn Power Co. V. State, 23
Wyo. 271, 148 P. 1110 (1915) (report of state
engineer's action on a permit application that was
not appealed). A common thread runs through these
cases: Economic development is in the public
interest, and a project that will impede maximum
development is detrimental to the public interest.

C.

The half century following the initial group of
cases was characterized by quiescence. Applications
to appropriate evidently generated little controversy, probably because nearly all proposed beneficial
uses were viewed as serving the public interest.
1. The most notable legislative development was a
4

1929 Oregon law that said in determining the
public interest, "the state reclamation commission shall have due regard for conserving the
highest use of . . . water for any and all
purposes, including [among others] public
recreation and the protection of commercial and
game fishing or any other beneficial use to
which the water may be applied." Act of Feb.
28, 1929, ch. 245, § 1, 1929 Or. Laws 252-53.
2. The major public interest review case during
this period was Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494,
136 P.2d 957 (1943), where the court upheld a
decision by the state engineer to subordinate an
application for power use that would interfere
with a junior application for domestic and
irrigation purposes in addition to power use.
The court reasoned that the greater beneficial
use of the latter project would better serve the
public interest. A common law use preference
for domestic and agricultural uses also appears
to have figured into the decision.
D. A striking theme emerges from Tanner and the earlier
cases: Public interest review meant little if
anything beyond assessing whether a proposed
appropriation would conform to the goal of maximizing economic development. No attention was given to
the effect of a proposed appropriation on public
values such as scenic beauty, recreational use, and
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fish and wildlife habitat.
IV. Content of Modern Public Interest Review
A. Relevant Factors
1. Modern statutes on water right allocation and
transfer vary in how much guidance they give
administrative officials about potentially
relevant factors in public interest review.
a.

Permit statutes in three states comprehensively define the public interest and
include public values. Alaska Stat. §
46.15.080(b) (1984); N.D. Cent. Code g 6104-06 (1985); Or. Rev. Stat. g 537.170(5)
(1985). The Alaska statute, for example,
enumerates eight factors bearing on the
public interest, including "(3) the effect
on fish and game resources and on public
recreational opportunities; (4) the effect
on public health; . . . [and] (8) the effect
upon access to navigable or public waters."

b.

Some permit statutes lack comprehensive
definition of the public interest but still
give significant guidance on relevant
factors and expressly include some public
values in the calculus. For example, in
California a series of statutes governing
new appropriations requires consideration of
the state water plan; the relative benefit
from various beneficial uses of the water
6

concerned including, among others, preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife
and recreation; streamf low requirements
proposed for fish and wildlife purposes
under other legislation; water quality
control plans established under other
legislation; and a state goal of providing a
decent home and suitable living environment
for every Californian. Cal. Water Code Hi
1256-59 (West 1971 & Supp. 1987).
c. Finally, other permit statutes give little
or no specific guidance about public
interest review or the role of public values
therein. E.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. § 533.370(3)
(1985); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 72-5-6, -5-23, 12-3.E, -12-7 (1985 & Supp. 1986); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. 511 90.03.290, -.44.060
(1962).
2. The Washington and Idaho courts have construed
statutes that lack specific guidance on relevant
factors.
a. Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82
Wash.2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973), arose
under a statute that prohibits appropriations detrimental to the public welfare but
says nothing about relevant factors. The
department argued that it did not have to
consider the water quality effects of a
7

proposed appropriation because (1) other
state agencies had authority to regulate
pollution and (2) the statutory public
welfare criterion for water permits dated
back to 1917 and in historical context was
unrelated to pollution concerns. The court
rejected both arguments, relying on two
recent pieces of legislation to supplement
the vacuous permit statute. The State
Environmental Policy Act of 1971 made
environmental protection a mandate of every
state agency for major actions significantly
affecting the environment, and the Water
Resources Act of 1971 declared a policy of
protecting and enhancing the natural
environment. These acts, said the court,
obligated the department to consider the
total environmental and ecological factors
of proposed appropriations.
b. Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 707 P.2d 441
(1985), involved a statute that prohibits
appropriations detrimental to the local
public interest and defines that phrase
vaguely as "the affairs of the people in the
area directly affected by the proposed use."
Idaho, unlike, Washington has no state
environmental policy act or broad water
resource policy act. However, the court
8

found other legislative guidance that showed
public values were an important component of
the local public interest.
The Idaho legislature did not add a
public interest clause to the permit statute
until March 29, 1978; and on the same day it
also enacted minimum streamf low legislation
expressly designed to protect fish and
wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation,
aesthetic beauty, transportation and
navigation values, and water quality. The
court concluded that the legislature must
have intended the local public interest in
the contemporaneous water permit statute to
include the same elements. Furthermore, the
court said that common sense suggests the
local public interest includes the comprehensive list of factors enumerated in the
Alaska permit statute, plus such specifics
as discouraging waste and encouraging
conservation. It summed up by saying that
the legislature intended to include any
locally important factor impacted by
proposed appropriations.
3. Related to the statutory construction question

just discussed is the administrative law
doctrine of nondelegation, which limits the

et'

delegation of legislative or judicial powers to

an administrative agency. A common formulation
of the doctrine says a delegation is invalid
unless limited by standards to guide administrative discretion and enable judicial review to
determine whether the agency followed the
standards. See 1 F. Cooper, State Administrative Law 54-61 (1965).
a. The doctrine was argued without success in
several older water permit cases. East Bay
Mun. Util. Dist. v. Dep't of Public Works, 1
Ca1.2d 476, 35 P.2d 1027 (1934); Clark v.
Briscoe Irr. Co., supra; Tanner v. Bacon,
supra.
b.

Dictum in a recent case suggests a different
approach. The Oregon permit statute for new
appropriations comprehensively enumerates
factors that bear on the public interest.
But the court hinted that if this were not
the case, it "might" require the permit
agency to adopt rules establishing more
definite standards before acting on permit
applications. Steamboaters v. Winchester
Water Control District, 69 Or. 596, 688 P.2d
92 (1984).

B. Weighing the Factors
1. Even the permit statutes that provide considerable guidance about relevant factors typically
give little help on how to weigh them.
10

2.

This is true of the Alaska permit statute, and
that is no accident. Alaska's water use act is
based on a proposed water code the state
employed Frank J. Trelease to draft. In his
report to the state setting forth and explaining
the code, Trelease commented on public interest
review of permit applications: "Making decisions
. . . will be difficult. No law can make them,
they must be made by people. . . . [T]he
balancing of benefits against cost must be
performed by the exercise of judgment."

is

Trelease, A Water Code for Alaska, A Report to
the State of Alaska 14-17 (1962), excerpted in
F. Trelease & G. Gould, Cases and Materials on
Water Law 138-40 (4th ed. 1986).
3.

Some states have statutes that appear quite
specific about certain aspects of the public
interest, such as detailed use preference or
area-of-origin protection statutes. E.a., Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann.

45-147 (Supp. 1986) (use

preference); N.D. Cent. Code § 61-04-06.1 (use
preference); MacDonnell & Howe, Area-of-Origin
Protection in Transbasin Water Diversions: An
Evaluation of Alternative Approaches, 57 U.Colo.
Rev. 527 (1986) (comprehensive coverage of areaof-origin legislation).
Nonetheless, under at least some of these
statutes a flexible or balancing approach might
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still apply. See, e.g., East Bay Hun. Util.
Dist. v. Dep s t of Pub. Works, supra, 35 P.2d at
1029 (hinting that a preference in issuing
permits for domestic use and then for irrigation
over other uses might be invocable only "[w]here
the facts justify the action"); City of San
Antonio v. Texas Water Commission, 407 S.W.2d
752 (Tex. 1966) (area-of-origin statute barring
transport to another watershed to the "prejudice" of anyone in the source watershed must be
construed in light of another statute calling
for maximum use of water; therefore, "prejudice"
can be found only if the benefits of transbasin
use would be less than the detriment to the
source watershed.)
4. The Shokal case, supra, from Idaho addressed how
to weigh the relevant factors:
The relevant elements and their relative
weights will vary with local needs,
circumstances, and interests. For
example, in an area heavily dependent on
recreation and tourism or specifically
devoted to preservation in its natural
state, [the Department of] Water
Resources may give great consideration
to the aesthetic and environmental
ramifications of granting a permit which
calls for substantial modification of
the landscape or the stream.
109 Idaho at 339, 707 P.2d 450. This does not
mean that all public interest elements are
flexible. The court also said the department
should not issue a permit for a proposed
12

facility that would violate mandatory water
quality standards, even though a different state
agency has the primary responsibility for water
quality. Apart from that, however, the court
said that the determination of "what the public
interest requires, is committed to Water
Resources' sound discretion." 109 Idaho at 339,
707 P.2d at 450.
5. The exercise of administrative discretion is

subject to judicial review. The scope of review
varies among the states.
a.

One approach is a trial de novo, in which
the court hears new evidence and makes a new
decision with no deference to the administrative determination. E.o., Utah Code
Ann. & 73-3-15 (1980).

b.

More commonly, review is on the administrative record with the courts applying various
tests depending on the jurisdiction and the
issue on appeal. The courts generally use
standard administrative law jargon such as
error of law, lack of substantial evidence
for factual findings, clearly erroneous,
arbitrary or capricious, and abuse of
discretion.

c.

Bank of America National Trust & Savings
Ass'n v. State Water Resources Control
Board,42 Cal.App.3d 198, 116 Cal.Rptr. 770
13

(1974), illustrates the limits of agency
discretion under the substantial evidence
standard. The board had issued permits to a
land developer to store water in offstream
reservoirs, subject to the condition that
certain reservoirs on the developer's land
be kept open to the public for recreational
use. It concluded the condition was in the
public interest because the developer's
diversions would reduce the streamf low, and
public access to the reservoirs would
compensate the public for diminished
recreational opportunities on the stream and
possible adverse effects on fish.
On appeal, the court acknowledged the
board had power to impose a public access
condition if supported by substantial
evidence in the record. However, the court
decided that the record failed to support
the board's fears about diminished recreational opportunities and effects on fish
life, so it struck down the public access
condition.
C. Two Recent Decisions
1. In re Application for Water Permit No. 4580A-3,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final
Decision of South Dakota Water Management Board
(Oct. 29, 1986), dealt with unpleasant odor as a
14

relevant factor. A permit applicant sought to
appropriate groundwater for a large hog farm to
be located a couple miles from two recreation
areas on the Missouri River. The state water
management board found that nearly 127,000
people visited the recreation areas annually and
that the value of the recreational use was $2.5
million per year. It said that the occasional
presence of unpleasant odors from the hog farm
at the recreation areas was a significant public
interest concern. However, it concluded that
the probable difficulties with odors were
outweighed by the probable benefits from
economic development of the hog farm, which
would employ six people, use 200,000 bushels of
locally grown corn annually, and purchase
significant amounts of other materials in the
area.
2. In re Howard Sleeper, supra, a New Mexico trial
court decision now on appeal, considered public
interest factors in a water right transfer. The
applicable permit statute failed even to mention
the public interest, let alone define it. The
trial court ruled, however, that as a matter of
common sense detriment to the public interest
was an implicit barrier to transfer. It
concluded that the proposed transfer would be
detrimental to the public interest.
15

a. More specifically, the Sleener court on de
novo review overturned the state engineer's
approval of an application to transfer about
fourteen acre feet of water annually from
irrigated agriculture in northern New Mexico
to create an artificial lake at a planned
resort complex. The court focused on two
factors in finding detriment to the public
interest. First, although the proposed
resort would aid economic development of the
area, the poverty-stricken local residents
would receive little economic benefit
because they would end up in menial jobs
such as waiters and maids. Second, northern
New Mexicans have a fierce pride in their
culture, and ties to the land and water are
central to that culture. Although the
proposed transfer involved a small quantity
of water, the court feared the resort
development represented the first step
toward destruction of the local culture. In
sum, the court took a broad view of public
interest factors, treating as relevant both
the distribution of economic benefits and
cultural values not measurable in dollars.
b. Furthermore, the court did not mince words
in weighing the factors. The trial judge
said: "I am persuaded that to transfer water
16

rights, devoted for more than a century to
agricultural purposes, in order to construct
a playground for those who can pay is a poor
trade, indeed." Letter to counsel, at 7
(April 16, 1985).
V. Function of Public Interest Review
A.

The content of public interest review has clearly
changed over the years. To focus only on change,
however, can be misleading. This section undertakes
to show that despite changing content, the essential
function of public interest review has remained
constant.

B. Administrative regulation of economic activities is
typically based on a perceived failure of market
forces to deal adequately with particular structural
problems. S. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 15
(1982). With water resources, the key structural
problem is externalities.
1. An externality exists when an appropriator's
water use affects others, negatively or positively, but the appropriator does not take those
effects into account. In other words, some of
the costs or benefits of the appropriator's
water use are external to the his or her
calculations in deciding whether to make the
use.
2.

The problem with externalities is that they tend
to cause resource misallocation. For example,
17

if an irrigator of sugar beets does not have to
take into account the loss of downstream
recreational opportunities associated with his
water diversion, the result might well be the
production of too many sugar beets (or at least
the use of too much water in their production)
and too little downstream recreation.
C. Externality theory underlies modern public interest
review. See Trelease, Policies for Water Law:
Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Public
Regulation, 5 Nat. Res J

1 (1965). The Alaska

water permit statute's elaborate definition of
public interest factors reads like a catalog of
potential negative and positive water use externalities. Although Idaho's permit statute lacks a
detailed definition of the public interest, externality theory almost leaps out from its definition
of the "local public interest" as "the affairs of
the people in the area directly affected by the
proposed use." The Idaho court in Shokal did not
use the technical language of externality theory,
but it embraced the essence of that theory when it
said "the legislature intended to include any
locally important factor impacted by proposed
appropriations."
D. A closer look at the history of public interest
review reveals that from very the beginning the
courts were instinctively applying externality
18

theory.
1.

Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, supra, said it
would be detrimental to the public interest to
grant a permit for a large irrigation project if
the water supply is insufficient because failed
projects scare away potential investors in
future irrigation development. Similarly, In re
Commonwealth Power Co., supra, said it would be
detrimental to the public interest to grant a
permit for conflicting power projects because
the resulting interference and litigation would
scare away investors. Loss of investor confidence represents an external cost of failed
projects and conflicting projects.

2.

Young & Norton also said it would be detrimental
to the public interest to grant a permit for a
small irrigation project that would seriously
interfere with an otherwise feasible larger
irrigation project for which a competing
application is pending. Cookinham v. Lewis,
supra, applied the same reasoning to an application for a small project that would seriously
interfere with Carey Act development of a large
area. Big Horn Power Co. v. State, supra,
reported a decision by the state engineer that
it would be detrimental to the public interest
to grant a permit for a small hydroelectric
project in mining country without reducing the
19

height of the proposed dam to avoid interference
with use of the canyon for a railroad bed.
Cheap rail transportation was thought necessary
to promote large scale mineral development in
the region. These decisions all recognize that
an external cost of a small water project might
be the lost opportunity for greater economic
development.
E. The essential function of public interest review,

then, has always been to regulate externalities to
maximize benefits. The content of public interest
review has changed, but that simply reflects a
broader modern view of the kinds of benefits to be
maximized.
1. The concept of relevant externalities illuminates the relationship between constant function
and changing content. Almost any activity
involves external costs or benefits. Only some
externalities, however, are relevant: "An
externality becomes relevant whenever the
affected party is not indifferent to it." A.
Randall, Resource Economics: An Economic
Approach to Natural Resource and Environmental
Policy 157 (1981).
2.

In the early years of the West, the dominant if
not the only goal of the appropriation doctrine
was maximum economic development. Consequently,
relevant external costs involved concerns such
20

as loss of investor confidence and little
projects rendering big projects infeasible.
Today, the objective of water management in
probably all states is broader than economic
development. To borrow a phrase from the
National Water Commission, the objective now is
"greater productivity, in both monetary and
nonmonetary terms, from existing supplies."
National Water Commission, Water Policies for
the Future 227 (1973). With the broader
objective, more externalities become relevant.
As public values increasingly are a part of the
maximization goal, the effects new appropriations will have on public values increasingly
are relevant externalities.
3, The concept of relevant externalities also helps
explain the growing popularity of public
interest review for water right transfers. The
historical basis for regulating transfer
externalities is the rule that a transfer must
not injure any other water right, including
junior rights. The no injury rule forces a
transferor to take into account costs the
transfer will impose on other appropriators due
to reduced streamf low. Its major purpose
historically was to promote water development by
improving the security of supply for junior
appropriators. An external cost of allowing
21

unregulated transfers would have been loss of
enthusiasm for investment in new water use
projects, and this was a relevant externality
given the goal of maximum economic development.
Modern public interest review of transfers is
thus firmly anchored in appropriation doctrine
tradition. It is simply a tool, like the timehonored no injury rule, for dealing with (now)
relevant transfer externalities.
VI. An Assessment of Public Interest Review
A.Criticism%
1. While constancy of function may give modern
public interest review of water right allocation
and transfer a certain historical legitimacy,
that does not make it immune from criticism.
2. Administrative agencies have long allocated a
variety of scarce resources under public
interest standards. E.g., the Civil Aeronautics
Board used to allocate airline routes under a
public interest standard, the Federal Communications Commission allocates radio and television
broadcast frequencies under a public interest
standard, and the Corps of Engineers issues
permits to dredge and fill navigable waters
under that standard.
3. Regardless of the agency involved or the
resource allocated, public interest review tends
to draw the same criticisms: costly and time
22

consuming proceedings, lack of coherent standards, and (because of that) corrupt and
inconsistent decisions. Breyer, supra, at 7889.
4. Not surprisingly, the deregulation movement of
the last decade has reached some forms of public
interest review. E.g., airline route allocation
has been deregulated, and the allocation of
radio and television broadcast frequencies has
been partially deregulated. But public interest
review of water right allocation and transfer
has been in the ascendancy during the same
period. The question naturally arises of
whether this is incongruous or whether there are
sound reasons for the difference.
5. Unless one is willing to take the extreme, and
today untenable, position that public values in
water should never count for anything, the real
issue

is not

whether modern public interest

regulation is imperfect but whether there are
better ways to accommodate public values. Three
alternatives are examined below.
B. Better Standards
1. More detailed statutory enumeration of potentially relevant public interest factors might
help applicants and protestants prepare their
cases before the agency. However, that would
barely touch the problem of a lack of coherent
23

standards.
The effect of many standards . . . is
virtually the same as having none at all.
There is no clear indication of which
standards are more important, how they are
to be individually applied, or how varying
degrees of conformity are to be balanced.
The existence of so many standards effectively allows the agency near-total discretion in making a selection.
S. Breyer, supra, at 79. Thus, the solution
does not lie in greater enumeration of relevant
factors.
2. One approach to better standards inheres in the
Shokal statement that a permit should not issue
if a proposed facility will violate mandatory
water quality rules. Stated more broadly, the
idea would be to develop some quite specific
minimum standards by statute, administrative
regulation, or state water plan provision. An
example might be administrative guidelines on
minimum conservation requirements for various
categories of projects. Greater use oftdetailed
minimum standards could streamline the permit
process by quickly weeding out certain applications.
3. However, the minimum standards approach cannot
solve all, or perhaps even many, water right
allocation and transfer disputes. Ultimately,
the effort to develop better standards clashes
with the overall objective of greater productivity, in both monetary and nonmonetary terms,
24

from existing water supplies. That objective in
reality has multiple, conflicting and vague
components that cannot be reduced completely to
per se rules or mechanical standards. The
multiple, conflicting, and vague factors
relevant to public interest review simply mirror
the complexity of the overall goal and the
impossibility of prior consensus about what it
should mean in widely diverse and not always
foreseeable fact patterns.
C. Reliance on other Reaulatory Tools
1.

It might be argued that water permit agencies
should minimize or ignore public values in
public interest review because the legislature
through water pollution, land use, and minimum
streamf low reservation or appropriation legislation has created other tools to protect such
values. The contention, for example, might be
that rules developed under the other regulatory
tools should preclude the water permit agency,
as a matter of sound policy if not legality,
from applying more stringent standards in public
interest review.

2. The South Dakota hog farm case provides an
illustration. A commentator on the case has
said: "One might argue that a decision on
whether a potentially odor-causing facility
should be allowed is better handled in a zoning
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proceeding. Indeed, the local zoning board was
confronted by the same issue with regard to this
company at about the same time." Rocky Mt. Min.
L. Fdn., Guhin, XIX Water Law Newsletter No. 3,
at 6 (1986) If local zoning allowed a hog farm
at the proposed site, should that have precluded
the state water management board from considering the effect of hog odor on the recreation
areas along the Missouri River?
3. Though not directly in point, experience under
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
illuminates the issue. The Atomic Energy
Commission's initial rules on environmental
impact statements prohibited its hearing board
from independently evaluating and balancing
certain environmental factors if other responsible agencies had already certified that their
own environmental standards were satisfied by a
proposed project. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C.Cir. 1971), rejected that
approach for the following reason:
The point of the individualized balancing analysis is to ensure that . . . the
optimally beneficial action is finally
taken.
Certification by another agency that
its own environmental standards are
satisfied involves an entirely different
kind of judgment. Such agencies,
without overall responsibility for the
particular federal action in question,
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attend only to one aspect of the
problem: the magnitude of certain
environmental costs. . . . [T]here may
be significant environmental damage
(e.g., water pollution), but not quite
enough to violate applicable (e.q.,
water quality) standards. Certifying
agencies do not attempt to weigh that
damage against the opposing benefits.
Thus the balancing analysis remains to
be done. It may be that the environmental costs, though passing prescribed
standards, are nonetheless great enough
to outweigh the particular economic and
technical benefits involved in the
planned action.
The court ruled that the Commission could demand
stricter water pollution controls from its
licensees than required by the water quality
standards of the certifying agency. Congress
later overturned this specific ruling. Clean
Water Act § 511(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(2)
(1982). Whether the congressional action also
bars federal agencies from weighing water
quality impacts in their overall balancing of
costs and benefits under NEPA is unclear. D.
Mandelker, NEpA Law and Litigation § 2:17
(1984). But with other environmental impacts,
the logic of Calvert Cliffs' still applies.
Southern Oregon Citizens v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475
(9th Cir. 1983) (herbicide registration); Oregon
Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901
(9th Cir. 1983) (pesticide registration).
4. To apply the NEPA experience to public interest
review of water permit applications, suppose a
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proposed appropriation or transfer will adversely affect water quality but will not violate any
applicable effluent limitation or water quality
rule. If that will be the only adverse effect,
maybe the water permit agency should defer to
the announced state water pollution policy, as
established by perhaps a different agency, and
not condition a permit on compliance with
stricter effluent limitations. But even if that
is so, a different case arguably would be
presented by a proposed appropriation or
transfer that will have a combination of adverse
consequences, none of which violate any individual water quality, land use, or minimum
streamf low standards, but which cumulatively
mean the costs exceed the benefits. With
responsibility for water pollution control, land
use regulation, and minimum streamf low reservations or appropriations, typically divided among
different agencies or entities, public interest
review of water permit applications is perhaps
the only feasible mechanism for an overall
balancing of costs against benefits for specific
projects.
D. Reliance on Well-Defined, Marketable Property Rights
1. Some commentators have argued that externality
problems with water resource use can be solved
better by redefining property rights than by
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administrative regulation. E.g., T. Anderson,
Water Crisis: Ending the Policy Drought (1983);
J. Hirshleifer, J. De Haven & J. Milliman, Water
Supply: Economics, Technology, and Policy chs.
3-4 (1970); Gardner, The Untried Market Approach
to Water Allocation in New Courses for the
Colorado River 155 (G. Weatherford & F. Brown,
eds. 1986); Williams, The Law of Prior Appropriation: Possible Lessons for Hawaii, 25 Nat.
Res. J. 911, 924-28 (1985).
2. They propose a property rights system for the
resource characterized by rights that are welldefined, enforced, and transferable. For
example, suppose an appropriator has a right to
divert a certain quantity of water to irrigate
sugar beets, but the water or part of it would
be more valuable if left in the river to provide
downstream recreation. Since the benefits
downstream are external to the appropriator's
calculus, he will have no incentive to leave the
water in the stream. However, the market would
reallocate the use from irrigation to recreation
if (1) the law were changed to allow an entrepreneur to hold an instream appropriation for
recreational use, (2) the entrepreneur could
enforce that right by charging recreational
users a fee, and (3) the irrigator's right were
freely transferable. The entrepreneur would
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then make a purchase offer to the irrigator that
would bring the downstream values into the
irrigator's calculus. The externality would
disappear.
3. Critics of the property rights approach raise
various objections. First, it would often be
difficult if not impossible to enforce property
rights in public value water uses by excluding
those who do not pay. Second, water rights are
not always sufficiently well-defined for the
market to work as a reallocator. Without welldefined rights, bargaining is hampered because
potential purchasers are unsure of what they
would be buying. Third, unregulated appropriation of water under the rule that "first in time
is first" would award rights based on a race to
use water, and the resulting initial allocation
would not likely maximize benefits from the
resource. Even if market forces could later
reallocate water rights to the more valuable
uses, market transactions entail costs to gather
information and negotiate bargains. Public
interest review of new appropriations would
promote efficiency by achieving a better initial
allocation that would reduce the need for later
transaction costs. Fourth, even if market
forces would adequately reflect public values at
present, it is doubtful they would do so for
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future generations because the private sector is
likely to use too high a discount rate in making
investment decisions and thus value future
benefits too low. See, e.g., A. Randall, supra,
at 187-88; Scarce Water and Institutional Change
10-11, (K. Frederick ed. 1986); Runge, An
Economist's Critique of Privatization 71, in
Public Lands and the U.S. Economy (G. Johnston &
P. Emerson, eds. 1984); Gould, Water Use and the
Prior Appropriation Doctrine 21, paper presented
at Western Water: Expanding Uses/Finite Supplies
Conference (Natural Resources Law Center,
University of Colorado, June 2-4, 1986).
4.

The more thoughtful property rights advocates
acknowledge that these criticisms have at least
some validity. They respond that despite its
imperfections, the property rights approach is
more likely than administrative regulation to
approximate an optimal allocation of water. In
other words, they say the risk of market failure
is less than the risk of government failure.

5. Regardless of the merits of the debate about
market failure versus government failure, the
property rights approach faces two serious
obstacles.
a. First, it is far from clear that people
really want to treat water as purely a
market commodity. A natural resource
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economist has observed:
All societies identify some goods,
services, amenities, and resources
that, it is thought, ought to be
beyond the reach of commerce. There
are many different ways of expressing this idea: "the best things in
life are free"; "some things ought
not to be bought and sold, but
should be considered everyone's
birthright"; and "some things are
too important to be left to the
market." Different cultures have
entirely different notions as to
which goods, amenities, and resources ought to be immune from
market influences, and some societies place many more items in that
category than do others. In the
United States, natural environments,
wild rivers, and historical sites
are often considered to be in that
category.
A. Randall, supra, at 187.
b. Second, reliance on public interest review
to deal with the externalities of water use
has deep roots in appropriation doctrine
history. Recent expansion of the concept of
relevant externalities to keep pace with
evolving water management goals constitutes
no change in essential function and no more

than incremental change in content. The
property rights approach, in contrast, would
represent more radical change. Radical
change is difficult to achieve because of
what some might condemn as inertia and
others might praise as institutional
stability. The kind of radical change that
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the property rights approach represents is
unlikely to occur absent widespread and
intense dissatisfaction with the public
interest review approach to externalities.
There is little present evidence of that
kind of dissatisfaction with the way public
interest review has been evolving.
VII. Conclusion
A. In 1914, Roscoe Pound described how the law was
beginning to impose social limitations on the use of
property. About water, he wrote:
Recently a strong tendency has arisen to
regard running water and wild game as res
publicae, to hold that they are owned by the
state, or better, that they are assets of
society which are not capable of private
appropriation or ownership except under
regulations that protect the general social
interest. It is too early to say just how
far this tendency will go. But it is
changing the whole water law of the western
states.
Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules
and Doctrines, 27 Han. L. Rev. 195, 234 (1914). In
1971, a report prepared for the National Water
Commission on administrative allocation of water
commented that "the noted 'strong tendency' has been
slow to develop." E. Clyde & D. Jensen, supra, at
5. Two years later, the Commission itself concluded: "State laws in many instances are inadequate
to protect important social uses of water."
National Water Commission, Water Policies for the
Future 278 (1973).
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B. Since then, state laws have changed in various ways
to become more adequate, and evolving public
interest review has contributed toward that effort.
There is now a strong if not irresistible trend in
the statutes and cases to treat public values as
relevant factors in public interest review. It is
harder to generalize about the weight of public
values in the balancing part of public interest
review. The reported balancing cases are too few
and the issues too fact specific. Putting aside the
New Mexico resort complex decision, which did not
involve public values in the usual sense and which
may or may not survive appeal, the cases do not
reveal great boldness in weighing public values. On
the balancing question, a paraphrase of part of
Roscoe Pound's nearly three-quarter century old
observation is still appropriate: It is too early to
say just how far this tendency will go. But it is
changing the whole water law of the western states,
not radically but incrementally.
C. Over the years, some elements of the public interest
have crystallized into more or less specific rules,
such as use preferences and minimum standards. But
the public interest will never be fully reducible to
mechanical rules. There will always be hard
questions of judgment. Public interest review
enables reasoned debate about those questions.
Though public interest review is not a marketplace
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in the sense desired by advocates of the property
rights approach, it constitutes a marketplace for
ideas about what to value.
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